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The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change: 
Bilateralism Begetting Multilateralism in Promoting 
a Climate Change Regime?
Introduction
On 5 September 2005, during the 8th EU-China Summit held in Beijing, the European 
Union  (EU)  and  China  signed  an  agreement  to  establish  a  bilateral  Partnership  on 
Climate  Change.  The aim of  this  partnership  was to  provide a  mechanism for  both 
partners to develop a shared strategic view on common climate change objectives and 
to  establish  cooperation  activities,  in  order  to  offer  common  solutions  to  the global 
problem  of  climate  change.  The  signatories  pledged  to  strengthen  the  dialogue  on 
climate change policies, exchange views on key issues in climate change negotiations 
and  develop  concrete  actions  to  tackle  climate  change  by  carrying  out  specific 
cooperative projects. Given that their economies are highly interdependent – China is 
the EU’s second largest trading partner while the EU is China’s first – as well as high 
levels of mutual investment and considerable economic complementarities, China and 
the EU would appear to share great potential for cooperation.
Nevertheless,  the  nature  of  this  partnership  needs to  be  questioned.  Indeed,  as  its 
actors  do  not  necessarily  share  either  the  same  attributes,  or  have  equal  power 
attributes, it might be argued that the EU-China partnership on climate change can be 
considered as an example of “asymmetrical bilateralism”. This characterisation arises 
from several factors. First of all, the actors involved are, on the one hand a nation-state, 
while, on the other hand, a confederation of nation-states with some significant elements 
of a federation. This disparity clearly puts the two partners in an asymmetrical position, 
as the EU directly relates to China, but China may prefer to relate to the EU as a whole, 
or to individual member states according to the specific issue, and to adopt a divide and 
rule  approach if it is convenient in achieving its objectives. Of course this approach is 
deleterious for the EU’s external image, as from a third country’s point of view it can be 
seen as lacking policy coherence. This incoherence has been recently become manifest 
during the Copenhagen summit  negotiations of  December  2009,  where the Member 
States were not able to speak with one voice, and there was worrying disagreement 
about  the  EU’s  contribution  in  reducing  GHG  emissions  and  about  the  financial 
resources to be provided to fund pollution-abating measures in developing countries. At 
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the Cancun summit a year later there was some greater coherence in the EU position. 
But  once  again  it  did  not  really  have  an  impact  as  a  unitary  actor.  Secondly,  this 
difference in their nature consequently leads to different sorts of powers. 
While  the  Chinese  government  may  be  seen  to  be  internally  torn  by  competing 
pressures and constant conflicts of interest among different party factions and between 
central and local government actors, it maintains the capacity to impose its centralised 
policies  on critical  subjects.  This  control  is  crucial  given  the necessity  of  promoting 
economic growth and well-being in a country marked by a highly uneven distribution of 
income. But the EU copes daily with twenty-seven different countries’ interests and has 
a complex decision-making procedure that  really  slows the capacity  of  the Brussels’ 
institutions  to  make  important  decisions  and  then  to  defend  them,  especially  on 
environmental  issues,  where  there  is  shared  competence  with  the  member  states. 
Moreover, as the EU, arguably, lacks a common economic policy, single Member States’ 
economic interests and positions often diverge from the EU’s objectives of sustainable 
development. This lack of control exacerbates the difficulties for the EU as a whole to 
translate its political will and preferences into concrete policies, to speak with one voice 
and, ultimately, to fully implement agreements with third partners.
With  these  questions  in  mind,  this  paper  attempts  to  examine  if  the  EU-China 
partnership  on  climate  change  can  be  considered,  as  intended,  as  an  important 
contribution to a  multilateral  solution  to the climate  change issue by undertaking an 
assessment  of  current  results.  Concerning  this  partnership,  in  2007  Kerry  Brown 
(2007:47)  asserted  that  up to  this  point,  the  bilateral  EU-China  dialogue  on climate 
change “had been short of substance”. Yet both partners had expressed ambitious goals 
of creating a common market for low-carbon products and services, and had started 
“mapping out  their  common concerns and priorities”  by looking for  a stable plan for 
cooperation (their purported partnership). Moreover, both were aware of their necessity 
to  have  stable,  secure  and  sustainable  energy  supplies.  Nevertheless  Brown 
demonstrated that the partnership was seen as being too politicised, “with competing 
agendas not only within separate parties to the dialogue”, but also “with third parties”, 
such as the US and India (Brown 2007:47). On the one hand, China clearly expressed 
its need for funding and for technology to respond to its huge environmental challenges, 
while the EU asked for a major Chinese “commitment to a long term strategic plan” to 
abate  its  emissions,  “support  clean  energies”  and,  above  all,  to  “offer  more 
transparency” on its policies and on the means it employed to achieve its goals (Brown 
2007:48). But as the two partners have left their positions substantially unchanged – as 
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evidenced in the Copenhagen and Cancun conferences – and have shown a lack of 
substantial agreement on climate change issues, it is not surprising that this partnership 
can be mainly seen what can be familiarly described as “a dialogue of the deaf”. With 
this observation in mind, this paper attempts to provide insight on a bilateral initiative 
that has sought to play a significant role in global climate change negotiations, but that 
has, in the end, fallen short of achieving its wider objectives. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  It  firstly  provides  a  general  description  of  the 
objectives of the partnership and of the specific projects of cooperation that the EU has 
established  with  China  within  the  framework  of  the  partnership  on  climate  change. 
Secondly,  it  seeks to outline the ideological  context of  this partnership,  by placing it 
within  overall  European  and  Chinese  efforts  to  create  multilaterally  the  security 
conditions  required  to  be  able  to  pursue  their  own  domestic  objectives.  As  climate 
change, climate security and environmental security have become matters of concern 
for the international community,  the EU-China partnership on climate change can be 
understood in the light of their strategic commitment to counter non-traditional security 
threats. Finally, the paper attempts to make an assessment of results to date, in order to 
identify issues on which the two partners still need to dialogue and where they still need 
to deepen and improve their commitments.
Why is the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change so 
Important, at Least Theoretically?
The Objectives of the Partnership and its Extended Meanings
In their Rolling Work Plan issued on 19 October 2006, China and the EU expressed their 
willingness to develop a Bilateral Consultation Mechanism whose role was to “provide 
broader political coordination and guidance for the implementation of the partnership” 
and to “strengthen their dialogue on climate change policies and exchange views on key 
issues  in  the  climate  change  negotiations”.  Furthermore,  they  both  recognised  the 
importance of climate security (and to a wider extent environmental security) within their 
larger future security concerns. In order to contribute to the overall goal of controlling 
anthropogenic interference in the world’s climate, the EU acknowledged the necessity of 
involving developing countries (especially those experiencing high levels of economic 
growth with a subsequent high rate of greenhouse gases emissions) in a comprehensive 
cooperation  framework.  The  aim  was  to  help  these  countries  in  tackling  their 
environmental  problems  and  in  playing  their  part  in  global  negotiations  and  global 
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efforts. So, while the partnership with China has a bilateral nature, it is backed by (and 
also is designed to be backed by) multilateral and regional agreements. Indeed, both 
China and the EU are members of a number of multilateral technology bodies, such as 
the  Carbon  Sequestration  Leadership  Forum,  are  both  present  in  many  multilateral 
processes  and  forums dealing  with  climate  change,  and  both  belong  to  the  United 
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change. Moreover China and the individual 
EU member states have signed the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, by recognising the 
need for  differentiated and multi-speed approaches –  as  China and other  emerging 
economies are different from developed countries but also from developing ones – the 
EU decided to embark on this medium-term partnership on climate change, hoping to 
contribute to multilateral efforts to cope with climate change at the global level. China 
also hoped to benefit from the ripple effects in other developing countries induced by the 
prestige which accrues to economies in the eyes of the group of developing countries. 
Finally,  by instrumentalizing this partnership,  the EU has tried positively  to influence 
China’s  position  in  international  climate  change  negotiations,  through  supporting 
technical and financial assistance to develop specific projects capable of offering China 
valid alternatives to its model of development and also as an incentive to adopt a more 
constructive approach during international negotiations. For this series of reasons, the 
EU-China  partnership  on  climate  change  can  be  considered  as  a  bilateral  tool  to 
engender multilateral results. 
At the core of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change is the Near Zero Emission 
Coal  Project,  designed to demonstrate  the feasibility  of  carbon capture and storage 
technologies in China.  Specifically,  it  is  meant to be a first  test and an exemplar  of 
technological  and  financial  cooperation  between  developed  countries  and  emerging 
ones. In this regard, technology transfers are a frequent demand of developing countries 
at  all  international  climate  change  fora.  By  demonstrating  the  usefulness  of  these 
technologies in China, the EU would like to be able to deepen its experience and then to 
be able to carry out similar initiatives in other developing countries, as its way of making 
a  bilateral  contribution  to  the  global  effort  against  climate  change.  This  ambition  is 
clearly evident in the Communication adopted on 25th June 2009, Demonstrating Carbon 
Capture  and  Geological  Storage  (CCS)  in  Emerging  Economies  and  Developing  
Countries: Financing the EU-China Near Zero Emissions Coal Plant Project, in which the 
Commission expressly defined its focus on China “as a case study for cooperation with 
emerging  developing  countries”.  The  activities  implemented  in  China  are  thus 
complemented by capacity building projects and feasibility studies in other developing 
countries  such  as  Brazil,  India  or  South  Africa,  acknowledging  that  CCS  is  a  key 
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technology  in  the  fight  against  climate  change  and  in  the  mitigation  of  its  impacts, 
especially in developing countries. In fact, as emerging economies still mainly rely on 
fossil-fuels  to  nourish  their  growth,  the  deployment  of  CCS  technologies  has  the 
potential  to cut  their  emissions and help these countries  to meet  their  objectives of 
economic growth driven, however, by forms of sustainable development. 
By broadening our perspective to examine the overall climate change strategy of the EU, 
the multilateral purpose of these bilateral efforts with key developing countries becomes 
clearer. Indeed, from the European Commission perspective, they should be considered 
as instruments to explore “concrete contributions to the Copenhagen agreement from 
both developed and developing countries”.  (European Commission, COM 2009:12) In 
other  words,  bilateral  partnerships,  or  cooperation  between  the  EU  and  emerging 
economies,  should  push  these  countries  to  undertake  further  commitments  to  meet 
reduction targets within the context of international climate change negotiations and to 
“propose more ambitious low-carbon development strategies” (Ibid.) so that they begin 
to play their  part  in  global  efforts  against  climate change.  This  strategy was already 
apparent in the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, in which the Joint Declaration 
between the two partners claimed that through this cooperation they would emphasise 
their commitment to the objectives and principles of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore the two partners agreed to set up 
this partnership in this specific context, with the aim of strengthening cooperation and 
dialogue on climate change and including a research partnership to find new solutions to 
produce clean energy, as well as joint promotion of sustainable development. They also 
committed  themselves  to  strengthening  their  bilateral  dialogue  on  climate  change 
policies and to exchange opinions on the most important issues in the climate change 
negotiations, thus providing an important contribution to the global debate on this issue.
On a more operational level, China and the EU pledged to strengthen their cooperation 
by  developing and deploying low carbon technology,  in  order  to  promote  enhanced 
energy efficiency and a low carbon economy. For this reason, they agreed to work in 
different  areas  of  technical  cooperation  (extending  to  energy  efficiency,  energy 
conservation and new renewable energy to clean coal, methane recovery and its use, 
carbon capture and storage, hydrogen and fuel cells, and finally power generation and 
transmission).  Finally,  they  both  committed  themselves  to  “take  strong measures  to 
encourage low carbon technology development, deployment and dissemination” and to 
work  together  to  make  these  technologies  affordable  energy  options  for  developing 
countries, by exploring also all financial options (including the role of the private sector, 
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joint ventures, public-private partnerships and the potential role of carbon finance and 
export credits). (European Commission, SEC 2009:34)
 A Description of the Concrete Projects
In order to achieve their objectives, the EU and China agreed to carry out three main 
projects2,  —the  EU-China Clean Development Mechanism  (CDM) Facilitation Project, 
the  EU-China  Energy  and  Environment  Programme  (EEP)  and  the  EU-China 
Cooperation on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).
The first project, the  EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, officially started on 28th June 
2007 and ended in January  2010.  It  was conceived of  as the core pillar  in  China’s 
sustainable development process, as its purpose was to analyse the Chinese policy and 
regulatory regime involved in the development of the required management capacities to 
implement the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism. This flexible mechanism, 
established in  Kyoto Protocol’s Article 12,  expects developed countries (belonging to 
Annex I) to cooperate with developing countries (Non-Annex I parties) in their efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to facilitate the provision of assistance to them in 
their  sustainable  development  paths,  by  encouraging  developed countries  (bound to 
targets  of  reduction  of  their  GHG  emissions)  to  invest  in  developing  countries. 
Specifically,  through CDM projects,  developed countries help developing countries to 
reduce their emissions and receive equivalent Carbon Emission Reduction Credits that 
allow them to meet their own reduction objectives. 
As expressed by the Joint Declaration on Climate Change between China and the EU, 
one  of  the  objectives  of  the  partnership  was  to  “cooperate  to  strengthen  the 
implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), exchange information on 
CDM projects and encourage European and Chinese companies to engage in CDM 
projects cooperation”. Both partners thus engaged in a dialogue to improve and further 
develop CDM in China, by facilitating the exchange of information and experience and 
by promoting the practical implementation of other market-based instruments such as 
emission trading. 
2 But they are not the only projects contributing to the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. Indeed 
we can find also other projects, such as the Geocapacity project – Assessing Capacity for Geological  
Storage  of  Carbon  Dioxide,  a  specific  element  of  the  EU project  aiming  at  assessing  the  storage 
capacity  in  one test  area  of  China,  and  the Provincial  Climate  Change Strategy  on  Mitigation and 
Adaptation, whose purpose is to support the Chinese Government in translating its National Climate 
Change  Programme  into  specific  actions.  This  involves  developing  local  policies,  institutional 
frameworks,  partnerships  and  implementation  capacities.  Moreover,  the  EU-China  Biodiversity 
Programme and  the  EU-China  River  Basin  Management  Programme,  even  if  focusing  on  different 
issues, indirectly contribute to European cooperation on climate change issues within China.
6
Within  the  overall  framework  of  EU-financed  CDM  projects,  the  EU-China  CDM 
Facilitation  Project was  the  largest,  with  a  budget  of  €2.8  million  (See 
http://www.euchina-cdm.org/). It involved public and private actors at different levels, and 
its  main  activities  covered  a  wide  range,  from  policy  research  to  capacity-building 
projects and formulating recommendations for  decision-makers.  Specifically,  to reach 
their objectives, the two parties planned a different range of activities, mainly based on 
research  into  technology  transfer,  the  creation  of  a  CDM  market  before  2012,  the 
assessment of the impact of these projects on Chinese sustainable development and 
the improvement of CDM policies. All  these activities have been complemented by a 
series of other important measures, such as capacity-building projects, high-level policy 
tours, and broad stakeholder dialogue through conferences and workshops. 
The second project, the  EU-China Energy and Environment Programme, was officially 
established with the agreement signed by the European Community and the Chinese 
Government on 3rd April  2002. It had the specific objective of establishing a concrete 
action  plan  to  express  tangibly  the  political  intentions  of  the partners  further  to 
strengthen their co-operation in the energy sector. It was later absorbed, in 2005, into 
the  EU-China  Partnership  on  Climate  Change.  The  programme,  which  ended  on 
November  2009  and  had  a  total  funding  of  €43  million  (of  which  €20  million  were 
provided by the Commission),  had the overall purpose of promoting “a sustainable use 
of  energy”  and  to  provide  Chinese  energy  users  with  “a  secure  energy  supply  at 
improved  economic,  social  and  environmental  conditions”,  finally  “contributing  to 
improved environmental quality and health conditions” (See www.eep.org.cn). 
The  third  and  last  project,  EU-China  Cooperation  on  Carbon  Capture  and  Storage  
(CCS),  is  still  ongoing  and  constitutes  the core  activity  within  the framework  of  the 
Partnership on Climate Change. As has already been mentioned, this partnership has 
been developed to strengthen both the political dialogue on climate change, energy and 
environmental  issues,  and the cooperation  in  developing,  deploying and transferring 
clean technologies, improving energy efficiency and achieving a low-carbon economy. 
EU-China  Cooperation  on  Carbon  Capture and  Storage specifically  addresses  this 
second  goal,  by  testing  and  developing  new  near-zero  emission  coal  technologies 
through  carbon  dioxide  capture  and  storage  (CCS).  Recently  considered  by  the 
international community as a useful tool to reduce CO2 emissions in both developed and 
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developing  countries,3 CCS  technologies  can  enable  countries  to  capture  their 
emissions coming from coal-fired power plants and from energy intensive industries, and 
to store them in underground basins. Storing in basins, such as exhausted oil or gas 
basins,  saline  aquifers  or  sealed geological  strata  could  thus,  in  theory,  significantly 
reduce the flow of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere.
Given the ambitious aims of the project, this cooperation on carbon capture and storage 
is meant to end in the medium-term, normally in 2020, with the completed construction 
of  a  pilot  power  plant.  For  this  reason,  the  project  was divided into  three separate 
phases,  the first  one concerning two coordinated feasibility  studies,  the second one 
involving  deepening  the  studies  and  designating  a  specific  site,  and  the  third  one 
involving the construction of a commercial scale demonstration coal-fired power plant 
supplied with CCS technologies.  The choice to cooperate on CCS technologies has 
been conceived of as a tool both to minimize the environmental impact of a growing 
production of CO2 and also to meet one of the main challenges in China today: namely, 
reconciling its economic growth and its industrial expansion with its need to make its 
development  sustainable.  Even  if  China  has  already  developed  alternative  energy 
sources (such as wind energy, in which China seems to be the world leader) (Molinari,  
2009:2), it  still  relies upon coal and other fossil  fuels to produce the vast bulk of its 
energy for domestic needs4.  CCS technologies therefore potentially offer  a valid and 
remarkable means to keep producing energy from coal combustion without emitting high 
levels of CO2. And with this in mind, the EU planned to undertake pilot projects (both in 
Europe and in  China)  by 2015,  and to  make these technologies  available  by 2020. 
(European Commission, SEC 2009:5)
Bilateral Cooperation Designed to Engender Multilateral Action?
As  the  then  European  Environment  Commissioner,  Stavros  Dimas,  declared,  the  
EU-China  partnership  on  climate  change  was  meant  to  “act  as  a  model  for  
cooperation  under  the  post-2012  global  climate  change  regime” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climate/china.htm), that should have been agreed upon 
in Copenhagen in December 2009. It is thus noteworthy that, in its overall design, the 
partnership was intended to be an important step in the global search for solutions to 
3 The IEA recommended that by 2010 20 large-scale CCS demonstration projects need to be launched and 
the G8 Summit held in June 2008 in Aomori (Japan) supported this recommendation. See the Joint 
Statement by G8 Energy Ministers, Aomori (Japan), 8 June 2008, available at 
http://enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/g8/g8sta_eng.pdf
4     According to IEA World Energy Outlook 2008, Chinese fuel mix’s components are mainly made up of 
coal that in 2006 covered nearly 90% of domestic power generation.
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tackle climate change. The EU and China restated this position at the 10 th EU-China 
Summit (held in Beijing on 28th November 2007), in which the two parties emphasized 
the great importance they attached to the climate change issue and their willingness to 
strengthen their cooperation in order to jointly cope with the serious problems it may 
cause.  Both committed themselves to the stabilization of GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere  by  trying  to  reach  a  level  capable  of  preventing  any  dangerous 
anthropogenic interference inside the global climatic system, taking into account their 
common but differentiated responsibilities  and respective capabilities.  (Council  of  the 
European Union 2007:9) The two sides also restated their commitment to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, 
and reiterated the need for developed countries to continue leading in abating GHG 
emissions beyond 2012 and, at the same time, to help developing countries to increase 
their contribution in the global climate change efforts. (Ibid. p.10)
Two years later, at the 12th EU-China Summit held in Nanjing on 30 November 2009, the 
two parties re-emphasised the existence of serious challenges faced by the international 
community, that require international cooperation in order to provide a global response. 
Among these challenges, climate change was seen as an increasingly prominent issue 
and  the  two  partners  urged  deeper  international  cooperation  and  more  coordinated 
efforts to play their part in the global efforts.  (Council of the European Union 2009:1) 
More  interestingly,  both  sides  recognised  that,  as  the  international  context  was 
becoming more and more complex and changing rapidly, their relationship increasingly 
went further than a purely bilateral framework and had acquired a multilateral dimension. 
In fact they share common position on different international issues, and their quest to 
“actively meet global challenges and strive for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous 
world” cannot be completed without joint efforts and close cooperation. (Ibid. p.2)  Hence 
for some years the language of an ostensible strategic partnership has been used. It is 
in this wider context that the Partnership on Climate Change should be placed, as the 
two partners  share  a  great  potential  for  cooperation,  wide perspectives  for  bilateral 
relations,  and  the  possibility  of  having  a  significant  input  in  the  search  for  global 
solutions. But why do both actors focus on this partnership on climate change, and, 
moreover, why is this partnership seen as being so important, at least at a theoretical 
and political level?
Both the EU and China stated that they shared the view that “climate change is one of  
the most important global challenges of our times”, and that it  demanded urgent and 
cooperative action. For this reason, they agreed to further strengthen cooperation in this 
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area and work together with other international actors to find a comprehensive, fair and 
ambitious result in Copenhagen, and later Cancun based on the principle of common, 
but differentiated, responsibilities. (Ibid. p.3)   Thus, even if they did not only focus on the 
attainment  of  a  post-Kyoto  agreement,  both  partners,  by  endorsing  the  objectives 
expressed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the Kyoto Protocol, held a common view that their Partnership on Climate Change 
was essential. 
This mutually shared view sees strengthening their dialogue on climate change policies 
as a means to finding common positions in the international arena. On a rhetorical level, 
they both committed themselves to facing the common challenge of climate change and 
making it a keystone of their relationship over the last decade. Indeed, since the end of 
the 90s, the EU and China have embarked on an important phase of their relations by 
adding new topics of dialogue and, above all, by introducing more political subjects. This 
development  eventually  led to the acknowledgement of  the overriding importance of 
their dialogue on issues of global and regional concern, and to the creation of a strategic 
partnership in 2003. 
In the 12th EU-China Summit Joint Statement, both China and the EU agreed “to stay 
committed to  the strategic  nature”  of  their  relationship  and “pledged to  seek greater 
development  of  the  comprehensive  strategic  partnership  based  on  mutual  respect, 
equality, mutual benefit, openness and win-win cooperation.” (Ibid. p.2) This commitment 
was  already  clear  in  the  2001  Communication,  EU  Strategy  Towards  China:  
Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective EU  
Policy. The document, published on 15 May 2001, highlighted that it was in the clear 
interest of both China and the EU to work together as “strategic partners” on the global  
stage as their points of concern converged on many global governance issues. Then, in 
the 2003 Communication, the Commission affirmed that EU and China had more than 
ever an interest in collaborating to safeguard and promote sustainable development, 
peace and global stability.  (European Commission, COM 2003:3) The need to create 
strategic partnerships was furthermore stressed by the emergence, with the end of Cold 
War and the events of 11th September 2001, of new kinds of threats – like terrorism and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – that have undoubtedly pushed the 
international community to review traditional concepts of security. As these matters have 
taken on an international and a global dimension, becoming the main points of concern 
of the world community, they have consequently required action at the multilateral level. 
Hence,  from  this  perspective,  the  bilateral  framework  of  an  EU-China  “strategic 
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partnership” can be considered as a bilateral commitment leading to finding common 
global  solutions to  these problems.  It  may also enhance their  joint  contribution  at  a 
multilateral level. At the same time, by offering itself as an “example”, the EU hopes to 
encourage China to increase its  contribution  to  global  stability  by becoming a more 
“responsible  stakeholder”,  namely  by  increasing  its  willingness  and  its  capacities  to 
cooperate  at  the  international  level  to  help  resolve  global  problems. As  the  EU 
progressively  acknowledged  China's  role  as  an  important  world  player,  through  this 
“strategic partnership”, it was willing to give to its partner an opportunity to become a 
more responsible stakeholder. But there still remain questions that require answers, the 
most pronounced of which is what a “strategic partnership” really implies.
Unfortunately, we still lack a wide and comprehensive definition of this term, nor are we 
able to define what the “strategic partnership” between the EU and China is meant to be. 
Both sides agree that its construction would be a fundamental step to giving further 
relevance to cooperation on a purely strategic level. Besides, the EU had directly chosen 
the  instrument  of  a  strategic  partnership  both  to  acknowledge  China’s  increased 
presence on the international stage, as well as positively to influence it and thus to avoid 
China’s re-emergence as a world power engendering serious disruption to the existing 
international  status  quo  (Feng  2007:268).  Finally,  its  purpose  was  to  encourage  its 
partner  to  make  a  greater  contribution  to  global  governance  by  insisting  that,  in  a 
globalized  world,  security  and prosperity  depend  on an  effective  multilateral  system 
(Feng 2007:268). Through this strategic partnership the EU was supposed to clarify its 
definition of the environment it sought for political discussions and dialogue. However, as 
for the contents of the strategic partnership, if still looked at it from the perspective of 
traditional security, it can be seen as lacking “strategic” aspects because it does not deal 
with  the  traditional  cooperation  in  the  hard  security  area:  military  cooperation,  joint 
exercises, defence technology transfer, etc. Rather, the partnership focuses on the new 
global challenges that go beyond classical military security threats and encompass a full 
range of risks in which we can also include climate change — what Bailes and Wetter 
(2007:178) call the “softer sides of security”. These aspects can be considered at the 
core of their political dialogue on international issues, as it can be seen in their last joint 
declarations. For example, in the first lines of the 12th EU-China Summit Joint Statement, 
published on 30th November 2009, it is stated that leaders of both sides: 
“agree that the international community faces serious challenges which call 
for a global response. Global issues such as climate change, financial crisis, 
energy  and  resource  security,  food  security,  the  environment  and  public 
health security have been increasingly prominent. Non traditional security 
threats […] have become global concerns. The instability and uncertainties 
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in the international landscape have posed challenges to the world peace 
and  development.  (Thus)  It  is  becoming  increasingly  urgent  for  the 
international  community  to  deepen cooperation  and  coordinate  efforts  in 
tackling these challenges”. (Council on the European Union 2009:1)
This declaration demonstrates the shift  in  the priorities of  international  relations that 
occurred after  the end of  Cold  War,  in  which non-traditional  security  concerns  have 
started  to  be  prioritized  in  the  context  of  international  organisations  and  within  the 
security frameworks of individual countries. Even if military security is still a matter of 
concern for many states - as can be noticed by the extent of public military expenditure 
of major countries, such as the USA and China - in the last twenty years security experts 
have started to focus on, and embrace, other problems that may be at the heart of an 
increased instability and the spread of conflicts both at the national and international 
level.  Among these issues, those surrounding the environment take a very important 
place:  they have been conceived as current  and future  factors causing internal  and 
international instability that may spread into other, larger, security concerns. For these 
reasons, a vast literature on “environmental security” has recently started to emerge. 
In  the  context  of  this  research,  the  question  of  “environmental  security”  and,  more 
particularly, the threat that climate change may constitute for national and international 
stability, can be considered in some ways as the reason behind the willingness of the 
two actors to focus their latest environmental cooperation on the possible multilateral 
strategies  to  adapt  to  the  impact  of  climate  change.  In  their  first  Joint  Declaration 
released on September  2005,  EU and China decided to bring about  this  adaptation 
through different coordinated actions, namely aiming to produce research and analysis 
on  the  adverse  effects  of  climate  change,  on  the  vulnerabilities  and  on  the  socio-
economic  impacts  and  costs  of  climate  change.  They  also  aimed  to  enhance  the 
scientific, technical and institutional capacity to predict climate change and its impacts, 
to produce research on technologies and measures to adapt  to  climate change and 
promote  their  development,  and  to  raise  awareness  of  the  need  to  integrate 
considerations on both reducing vulnerability and on incorporating climate change into 
sustainable development strategies. (European Commission, SEC 2009:34)
The two partners thus were both cognisant of the risks that climate change may pose for 
internal  and external security.  In this  regard China has been even more concerned, 
given  that  it  has  experienced  tangibly  the  negative  and  destabilizing  effect  of 
environmental degradation and climate change within its own territory. Today, China’s 
massive  consumption  of  energy  and of  natural  resources,  combined  with  excessive 
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environmental pollution, constitute the main obstacles to the sustainability of the present 
Chinese  pattern  of  growth. As  Zhang  Ruizhang  has  pointed  out,  China  “has  been 
developing at the expense of its environment”. Its CO2 emissions for each million dollar 
of GDP were 12 times higher than that of Japan, 5 times higher than the US, and were 
ranked 57 out of 60 economies. […] “The severe air pollution causes up to 750,000 
premature deaths each year” (Zhang 2009:223). Moreover, this situation is a harbinger 
of  increased  social  instability  that  visibly  worries  the  Chinese  government.  On  this 
subject, Susan Shirk (2009:211) affirms that “a massive environmental or public health 
disaster could trigger regime collapse”, and this risk is one of the main reasons behind 
the  worries  of  the  Chinese  leadership  about  the  potential  of  instability  wrought  by 
growing social inequalities and by environmental degradation. It is clear then that the 
widespread  effects  caused  by  Chinese  environmental  pollution  will  present  in  the 
immediate future serious regional  and global  challenges and “China increasingly will 
become a focal point for concern and condemnation as the threats from global warming 
and other environmental stresses intensify” (Paus et al. 2009:20). 
This  urgent  situation  can  be  interpreted  as  the  basis  of  the  willingness  of  the 
international community – included the EU – to propose international cooperation with 
China (both on a bilateral or multilateral level) in order to help the country to tackle these 
problems and to provide relief for its huge and deep environmental concerns. In this 
context, after 1985 the EU started cooperating with China on environmental issues, and 
the Partnership on Climate Change may be considered as the latest development in this 
cooperation.  It  represents  an  attempt  to  encompass  different  aspects  linked  to 
environmental concerns by including references to security, and thus widening its scope. 
However, in order to analyse the effectiveness of their cooperation and to see to what 
extent the EU has been capable of influencing Chinese participation in climate change 
negotiations (as well as offering, through its example, best practices to China to modify 
its development model), it is useful to assess the results of this new phase in China-EU 
cooperation. Unfortunately, the outcomes of the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen in 
December 2009 and then, a year later, in Cancun would suggest that this partnership on 
climate change has not been particularly effective. In both cases the EU and China did 
not share any common position and did not act together as “strategic partners” during 
the  negotiations.  Nevertheless,  as  the  negotiations  are  still  ongoing  and  both 
conferences are just first steps in the process of framing a new post-Kyoto agreement, it 
is still not feasible to make a definitive assessment of this partnership. Moreover, the 
carbon capture and storage project is still going ahead, and it is too early to measure 
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any concrete results. But there are already some elements that may indicate where the 
EU has been successful and where progress still needs to be made.
A Preliminary Assessment of Current Results
By assessing some of the outcomes of the EU-China CDM Joint Implementation Project 
(and studying its different official reports) and of the EU-China Cooperation on Carbon 
Capture and Storage (CCS), an examination of the concrete results of this cooperation 
can be attempted. Have these initiatives helped the two partners to find meaningful ways 
of cooperating on climate change issue? Or is cooperation still  purely on a rhetorical 
level, without any concrete achievement from an operational point of view?
As far as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is concerned, the EU-China CDM 
Joint Implementation Project seems to have produced some interesting outputs. In fact, 
in the past few years the EU has become the main investor in CDM projects and the 
main buyer of CDM Carbon Emission Reduction Credits (CERs). Concomitantly China 
became the largest CERs producer and, thus, the most important worldwide supplier of 
emission reduction credits.5 This result is due to the fact that since 2006 there has been 
an increase in the number of CDM projects designed to reduce China’s GHG emissions 
– both those in the pipeline and those registered with the UNFCCC Executive Board. 
Nevertheless, this increase does not always accord with planned results, especially in 
attaining some of the general objectives of the jointly funded EU-China project – namely 
encouraging European and Chinese companies to engage in CDM project cooperation. 
Indeed  the  presence  of  institutional  problems  and  of  a  lack  of  a  comprehensive 
framework that could have regulated all of the activities planned by the project can be 
noted.
In general, the two partners have been globally successful as they have attained a large 
number of the set objectives, such as generating certified emission reduction credits 
(CERs),  creating a pre-2012 market  for  CDM in China,  and generally  improving the 
domestic Chinese framework for CDM management. But there are some elements that 
mitigate against these successes, if not outweighing them. Problems remain in two main 
areas: on the one hand, the impact of CDM on sustainable development and, on the 
other, the extent of technology transfer within CDM projects. The CDM’s core objective 
5 Its share of the total number of CDM initiatives accounts for the 35% in the whole world, and as its projects  
are on  the average larger than the other countries’ ones, its share of world total supply of CERs is about of 
42%, followed by India, who lags behind at 22.5%. All these information can be found at the EU-China CDM 
Facilitation Project, Final Report, March 2010, p.7
14
is  to  promote  sustainable  development  in  developing  countries,  yet  the  projects 
implemented in China do not completely achieve this objective, mainly because their 
focus was not entirely appropriate. As the EU-China CDM Facilitation Project reports 
highlight,  this  outcome  is  basically  due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  a  lack  of  general 
coordination  in  the mechanism and many project  stakeholders and developers have 
adopted a capital-oriented approach focusing only on maximising their own profits. They 
had shown almost no interest in cooperation to promote sustainable development and 
this  self-interested priority  may itself  raise  questions  about  the  quality  of  the  CERs 
produced. Secondly, stakeholders have different; or incomplete, understandings of the 
concept of sustainable development, often viewing it only as economic development or 
environmental protection, and thus lacking an integrated vision that may embrace within 
the concept of economic development environmental protection and social improvement. 
(EU-China CDM Facilitation Project, Final Report, p.16) 
Nevertheless, it is on the technology transfer issue that the most serious problems can 
be noted. Even if EU equipment for CDM projects in China accounts for about 47% of 
the total and is mainly concentrated on renewable energies – especially wind-power and 
biomass  –  there  are  still  some  problems  in  the  transfer  of  technology,  namely  the 
presence of institutional barriers and domestic regulations that remain hurdles. First of 
all, the most debated question is the problem of protecting Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs), which remains of great concern to European technology producers. Without any 
certain protection, European enterprises are hesitant to transfer the manufacturing of the 
core elements of environmentally sound technologies to China and only have exported 
secondary elements, in order to protect their products and their share of the market. Yet, 
this point is of concern at utmost importance for Chinese stakeholders, who complain 
that  the  excessive  protection  of  technology  holders  from  developed  countries  is 
preventing them from learning how to use these technologies  and making their  use 
widespread. This aspect must be emphasized because it indicates the presence of a 
strong divergence in approaches between China and the EU. As the Chief Negotiator for 
the EU in Cancun, Dr. Artur Runge-Metzger, has underlined, within the framework of the 
UNFCCC, China and the EU do not share the same view of technological cooperation. 
Indeed, while China encourages a “centrally-planned” approach, including a single fund 
and a single executive body at the multilateral level capable of directing international 
technology policy and focusing heavily on IPR, the EU still relies on a “decentralised” 
approach,  namely  preferring  the  market  and  market-based  mechanisms  to  promote 
technology  transfers.  For  the  EU,  “centrally  guided  efforts  should  [only]  be  used  to 
promote joint development and demonstration” and funding “should be done through 
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existing  channels”.  (Runge-Metzger  2010:5)  Secondly,  European  partners  note  that 
there is a lack of public support to sustain technology transfer. In this case, the EU has 
not provided subsidies or introduced other policies to encourage technology owners to 
engage in its transfer.  Consequently,  the high prices of  European technologies have 
prompted Chinese partners to buy national technology that may have similar features 
(albeit with some concern about their performance). Moreover, in China sector-specific 
regulations  further  hinder  the  transfer  of  technology.  For  example,  in  wind  power 
projects, project owners cannot import more than 30% of the technology required, thus 
forcing them to choose Chinese equipment – and in so doing favouring domestic design 
and production in China.  (EU-China CDM Facilitation Project,  Technology Transfer in  
CDM  projects  in  China,  p.16) The  need  (or  the  obligation)  to  substitute  Chinese 
equipment for that from Europe is directly linked to the first problem, namely the high 
cost of European equipment. The price differential alone between Chinese equipment 
and that from Europe pushes Chinese project owners to substitute cheaper Chinese 
technology for European technology. Thus, although Chinese partners might have been 
interested in the latest European innovations, their costs prevented project developers 
from being able to purchase them. 
In conclusion, the case of technology transfer shows that with a substantial lack of the 
right mix of policies and regulations, achieving the desired results has been hampered. 
Even  if  this  is  not  a  specific  objective  of  CDMs –  “CDM is  not  explicitly  driven  by 
facilitating technology transfer, but by cost calculations and revenues from CERs” (Ibid. 
p.18) – these kinds of initiatives (and indeed others that the EU has with China in the 
wider context  of  the Partnership  on Climate Change) are inevitably  accompanied by 
technology  transfers,  as  these  projects  require  the  provision  of  the  most  recent 
technological innovations. Yet, in order to facilitate technology transfer to China, it would 
have been useful to agree on policies and a regulatory framework, both at the national 
and at the bilateral/international level (Ibid.), to sustain this cooperation. As the CDM 
Facilitation Project report on technology transfer highlights, the EU “needs to recognize” 
that it has relevant benefits in “supporting technology transfer to China”, not only at the 
business and trade levels, but also in the wider effort of mitigating the effects of climate 
change. (Ibid. p.19) The report noted potential for technology transfer to provide trade 
benefits to European companies and to improve their competitiveness, not only in the 
Chinese  CDM  market,  but  also  in  the  global  market  for  sound  environmental 
technologies.  Such a development  might  help the EU further  establish its  “status in 
international  negotiations”.  (Ibid.)  However,  for  the  moment,  the  EU  has  not  really 
provided public support for its companies to be competitive in the Chinese market. They 
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thus  are  compelled  to  compete  in  asymmetrical  conditions  compared  their  Chinese 
counterparts, who are widely supported by their government. As a report from Chatham 
House and E3G on Low Carbon Zones argues, public support “for closer cooperation 
with China is limited at best” in the EU and that is what makes European enterprises 
both  scared  of  Chinese  competition  as  well  as  feeling  excluded  from  the  Chinese 
market.  (Chatham House  and  E3G 2008:7)  These  firms  at  present  lack a  common 
European platform that may help them easily to enter the Chinese market, as well as 
negotiated  schemes  between  China  and  the  EU  that  can  let  European  companies 
operate  on  a  level  playing  field.  This  case  is  thus  another  where  the  idea  of 
asymmetrical bilateralism can be observed, as the EU and China are not cooperating 
under the same conditions: namely they do not offer equal conditions to their respective 
enterprises operating on the Chinese market, which, of course, puts the EU as a whole 
in a weaker position compared to its Chinese partner. 
More generally, while all of these initiatives are individually useful, at the same time they 
remain “too small and dispersed to have a transformative impact” (Ibid.) on the direction 
of  the  Chinese  climate  change  strategy.  Therefore,  even  if  the  intentions  of  the 
Partnership  for  Climate  Change  remain  noble  and  helpful  in  developing  more 
environmental awareness at the local level and for stimulating changes in production 
and consumption habits, its instruments are inadequate to bring about real progress in 
climate change negotiations. The whole structure of the partnership between the EU and 
China indeed lacks a “political understanding of the strategic common interests”, driven 
by the interdependence of their economies and of climate concerns. There is a lack on 
both sides of the “political conditions for a step (sic) change” in their cooperation. (Ibid.) 
On the Carbon Capture and Storage Project
The  Chatham House  report  previously  mentioned  also  insists  on  the  importance  of 
creating  low carbon  zones in  China,  by developing a  concrete and politically  visible 
demonstration plant “on a scale large enough to catalyse change at the national level 
and to transform external perceptions of China” (Ibid. p. 8). Indeed, without a reduction 
of carbon intensity in China, in the future the EU will  not be able to provide climate 
security for its own citizens. And that is the reason why, in the context of the EU-China 
partnership on climate change, EU-China Cooperation on Carbon Capture and Storage  
(CCS) covers the most important component. As has already been acknowledged, future 
Chinese  patterns  of  energy  consumption  inevitably  will  be  characterised  by  a 
preponderance of coal combustion. For this reason, recent domestic investment under 
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the aegis of the 11th Five Year Plan have developed a new generation of coal power 
plants, capable of significantly reducing CO2 emissions – and this has put China in the 
position  of  being  a  world  leader  in  the  use  of  cleaner  coal  power  generation 
technologies. But as the use of coal is widespread in the whole country –on Chinese 
energy consumption put the share at between 70 and 90% – there is a concomitant 
need to introduce measures to reduce its impact as the construction of new generation 
power plants is not sufficient to solve the problem. This is particularly the case as a large 
number of inefficient, but still operating, coal-fired power plants exist. 
In recent years, China has made significant progress in this direction, starting with an 
acknowledgement  of  the  need  to  take  additional  steps  to  further  reduce  emissions, 
including the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems. CCS indeed in theory 
could  play  a  significant  role  in  abating  GHG  emissions,  both  coming  from  power 
generation  and  energy  intensive  industry,  such  as  steel,  cement  and  aluminium 
production. They must be considered as an important option in a portfolio of different 
measures.  Further,  according  to  the  China-UK  Near  Zero  Emissions  Coal  Project 
Report, CCS is the only option available at present to ensure a significant reduction of 
CO2 emissions coming from power generation and energy intensive industrial sectors 
(China-UK NZEC Initiative,  Executive Summary).  While  the possibilities of  designing 
such forms of  cooperation are numerous,  the conditions for  their  realisation  are still 
problematical. The difficulties are basically economic in origin, accompanied to a certain 
degree by political, technical and environmental uncertainty. 
By the end of 2009, the first phase of the EU-China Cooperation on Carbon Capture and  
Storage come to its completion. Its objective was to produce two feasibility studies, one 
financed by the EU – COACH (Cooperation Action with CCS) project – and another one 
by Britain – UK Near Zero Emission Coal Initiative (UK-NZEC) – on CCS perspectives in 
China. In August 2009 also the STRACO2 (Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon  
Capture and Storage) project, whose aim was to identify the important issues linked to 
CCS-regulation  matters  and  to  provide  support  for  Science  and  Technology 
Cooperation,  had  come  to  an  end.  In  March  2010  the  two  coordinated  initiatives 
published two reports whose insights, combined with the STRACO2 report, are revealing 
of the future possibilities to implement this kind of project.
As previously mentioned, there are a series of problems that are still to be addressed in 
order to commence building effective carbon capture and storage systems in China and 
in the EU. Of course, the first phase is just a feasibility study whose task is to clarify 
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under which conditions the project must be realised and in which areas further research 
must be undertaken.  But some of  the questions that  have been raised raise  doubts 
about the real possibilities of such technology being concretely deployed in the Chinese 
context. The first is the cost both of the initiative and of its further implementation. The 
UK NZEC final report highlights the existence of “several challenges” that need to be 
further analysed through research and development, and that are particularly related to 
supplementary costs and the energy penalty of CCS technologies, namely the increased 
cost of electricity if this kind of technology is deployed in power plants. (Ibid. p.6) Further, 
the report acknowledges the existence of operational uncertainties linked to the novelty 
of the technologies and to the lack of methodology and of regulations. Finally, there is a 
question  of  the  availability  of  equipment  in  China,  a  subject  directly  linked  to  the 
technology transfer problem previously mentioned.
Be that as it may, as EU-China cooperation on CCS technologies has just entered its 
second phase of  realisation,  it  is  impossible  to  make a  general  assessment  of  this 
project. As it constitutes the core of the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, it is 
expected to be able to bring about the desired outcomes. But in order to ensure future 
fruitful cooperation at a bilateral level, the reports highlight the fact that the EU should 
focus on future CCS regulation and on agreeing to common standards and regulations 
with China, as well as helping the country in developing the abilities required to run this 
kind of project. (Ibid. p.51) For example, in site qualification and certification, the EU can 
be very helpful in transferring know-how and regulatory experience, thus enhancing the 
development  of  CCS  regulations  in  China.  More  generally,  the  advanced  level  of 
regulation in the EU could effectively be beneficial for China, but for these benefits to 
become real, the EU would need to involve all Chinese institutions concerned by the 
implementation of CCS in a deepened dialogue on CCS regulation.  In particular  the 
report highlights the need to include Member States in this dialogue, as they are the 
main developers of specific regulations. This shows another fundamental aspect of their 
bilateral relationship: as the China-UK NZEC Initiative Report highlights, for the Chinese 
partner, the member states (and not the EU), are  the most important partners of the 
dialogue.  (Ibid.  p.60) This  view  may  be  an  important  starting  point  of  reflection  for 
understanding how the EU is concretely perceived by its partners, and in this case by 
China.  On  the  issue  of  climate  change,  but  also  in  other  aspects  of  its  bilateral 
relationship with the EU, China always gives a special importance to its relationship with 
individual EU member states, especially the larger ones. This case is again a useful 
example to show that the EU and China do not cooperate in a symmetrical way, but 
rather in an asymmetrical one. The UK-NZEC report highlights a particular aspect of EU-
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China relations that  seems to confirm what John Fox and François  Godement have 
argued in their  study  A Power Audit  of  EU-China Relations.  They claim that  “China 
perceives the EU as disunited” (Fox and Godement 2009:7), and being aware of these 
divisions, it has become “a skilful and pragmatic power” able to transform EU pressure 
on  specific  issues  into  formal  dialogues  that  finally  end  up  becoming  “inconclusive 
talking shops” (Fox and Godement 2009:8).  Now, no actor would  wish that such an 
important and costly form of cooperation  turn out to be, ultimately,  an “inconclusive 
talking shop”.  But  the lesson that  can be learnt  from the report,  and from Fox and 
Godement’s study, is that the EU needs a more united approach towards China in order 
to  make  its  voice  heard.  More  generally,  Europe  needs  to  be  more  assertive  in 
displaying its leadership in the battle against climate change.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly,  technology  transfer  and  control  are  at  the  core  of  the  EU-China 
Partnership on Climate Change. They are preponderant among the objectives the two 
partners set in 2005,6 and at the base of each climate change mitigation and adaptation 
strategy. Thus, if the EU and China have not been capable of setting a clear framework 
for promoting technology transfer and technology dissemination and deployment, their 
Partnership  on  Climate  Change  cannot  be  said  to  be  really  successful.  Technology 
transfer  is  the  field  where  the  interaction  between  the  two  partners  can  be  best 
observed, because it is where the presence of different approaches can be noticed and 
where the most sensitive issues lie. 
As  we  have  seen,  China  would  prefer  a  “centrally  planned  approach”  within  the 
framework of the UNFCCC, while the EU has opted for a more market-decentralised 
approach (Runge-Metzger 2010:5). But in this case, the EU approach can be seen as 
excessively  “market-oriented”,  or  too  attached  to  free-market  principles.  This 
preoccupation  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  it  does  not  support  European  companies 
engaging  in  technology  transfer,  thus  placing  them  in  an  asymmetrical  position 
compared to their Chinese counterparts. One of the problems pinpointed by European 
companies in the project reports analysed was precisely the lack of economic incentives 
6 Five of twelve of these objectives deal with technology, namely strengthening practical cooperation on the 
development, deployment and transfer of low carbon technology to enhance energy efficiency and promote 
low carbon economy; encouraging low carbon technology development, deployment and dissemination, and 
working  jointly  to  ensure  the  accessibility  to  these  technologies;  co-operating  to  address  barriers  to 
development, deployment and transfer of technology; developing and demonstrating in China and the EU 
advanced, near-zero emissions coal technology through CCS; reducing significantly the cost of key energy 
technologies and promoting their deployment and dissemination.
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and of political support. As Holzer and Zhang argue, “it is essential to give the private 
sector  greater  incentives  to  transfer  its  technologies”.  They  suggest  that  the  main 
solution to this problem is not only cooperation at a political  level,  but that it  is also 
necessary “to take into strong account  the interests”  of the private actors by setting 
different “incentives for companies to engage in research and technology distribution”, in 
the form of tax incentives, subsidized credits or improved access to new markets for 
these technologies (Holzer and Zhang 2008:225). So the contribution of the two partners 
in defining a framework to promote technology transfer and its deployment is crucial for 
the partnership to be successful. 
In the 2009 Communication, the EU pictures itself as holding the “leadership role in the 
international  climate  change  negotiations”.  Europe  has  an  outstanding  number  of 
domestic  companies  with  the relevant  knowledge and  technologies  and  has started 
bilateral  partnerships  to  promote  technical  cooperation.  It  also  is  in  an  opportune 
position to facilitate the demonstration of these technologies in key developing countries, 
European Commission, COM 2009:17) and eventually to show its vaunted leadership. 
The Commission acknowledges that without the assistance of developed countries, the 
development  and deployment  of  these technologies in  emerging countries would  be 
significantly  delayed.  (Ibid.  p.13) Moreover,  the Commission claims that  this  kind of 
cooperation with new emerging countries “has the potential to underline” its credibility in 
the international climate change negotiations and could also set as a model for future 
technical cooperation and funding between developed and developing countries.(Ibid. 
p.39) But, in practice, it is salient to understand to what extent China considers the EU 
as an exemplar  of  environmentally  friendly  policies  and the impact  of  the  EU-China 
partnership within the context of global climate change negotiations. 
Freeman and  Holslag  (2009)  see the notion  of  a  partnership  as mainly  an illusion, 
especially from the EU side. First of all, Europe no longer can claim “supremacy” in the 
field of clean energy technologies, as emerging countries have started taking the lead 
on some specific technologies. For example, Brazil is the leader in biofuels while China 
is becoming the most advanced user of wind-power technologies and of solar energy.  
This new reality makes it difficult for China to perceive the EU as the leader in the global  
struggle against climate change. Secondly, Chinese observers of Europe also pinpoint 
an  element  of  weakness  in  the  constant  lack  of  coherence between the EU (more 
specifically the Brussels institutions) and the member states. They claim that “at the EU 
level environmental and commercial objectives are quite balanced”, but at the member 
state level economic interests and concerns still prevail, as European countries prefer to 
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promote their own economic growth and to protect their domestic companies (Freeman 
and Holslag 2009:29). Here, we find the reason why, from the Chinese point of view, the 
European member states still remain the most important partners of the dialogue. Thus 
China prefers to negotiate with them individually. 
This case says a great deal about the position of the EU as a global actor, as revealed in 
particular by the basic importance of single member states in China-Europe relations. It 
also requires a return to the concept of “asymmetrical bilateralism”, seen in the twofold 
aspect  of  a state versus a confederation of  states or  “something more”,  that  makes 
China prefer to talk directly to the member states. As mentioned above, John Fox and 
François  Godement’s  survey  of  EU-China  relations  clearly  argues  that  China  today 
clearly knows how to exploit and manage the splits among EU Member States, as it  
“treats its relationship with the EU as a game of chess, with 27 opponents crowding the 
other side of the board and squabbling about which piece to move” (Fox and Godement 
2009:3). Specifically, they categorize European member states into four groups, each 
one having different attitudes and preferences towards China, so capable of more or 
less influencing the EU’s final strategy towards China.7 They underline the fact that the 
divisions  between the  member  states  run  counter  both  to  the  need to  manage the 
Chinese impact on the European economy and, also, to finding ways to engage China 
politically.  Consequently,  the  EU’s  dream  of  transforming  China  into  a  “responsible 
stakeholder” or making it  “want what the EU wants” have been thwarted by Chinese 
assertiveness in  pursuing its own foreign policy’s  objectives.  For China this  involves 
pursuing its domestic development and defending its sovereignty on internal  political 
matters, and using Chinese capacities to take advantage of EU’s internal division as a 
way to obtain more negotiating power. As a result current EU’s efforts and its strategy 
towards China are far from optimal.
More specifically, concerning the EU’s capacity to influence Chinese attitude towards the 
climate  change  issue,  the  Partnership  on  Climate  Change  has  been  previously 
conceptualized as a “student-pupil relationship”, where the EU was expected to have 
sufficient “soft power” to persuade China to behave as a more responsible stakeholder 
in international climate change negotiations. But while Beijing has welcomed the EU’s 
initiative  of  cooperation  and  has  been  interested  by  the  EU’s  strong  environmental 
performance, these factors have not necessarily meant a significant change in China’s 
position on climate change. As Freeman and Holslag (2009:29) affirm— 
7 Their  proposed categories are  Assertive Industrialists (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic),  Ideological 
Free-Traders (Denmark,  the Netherlands,  Sweden and the UK),  European Followers (Austria,  Belgium, 
Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg) and Accommodating Mercantilists (all the others)
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“Despite friendly public statements directed toward Europe on their 
bilateral  cooperation,  China  refuses  to  recognise  the  EU’s  global 
leading role on climate change. […] Beijing is dismissive of the EU’s 
lack of political courage to accept tougher greenhouse gas targets, 
scorns its alleged green protectionism, and lambasts its reluctance to 
transfer its know-how. In the eyes of China, Europe pretends to be a 
responsible international player, but refuses to live up to this status.” 
The Copenhagen Summit of December 2009 confirmed this pessimistic assessment, as 
the  “mini-deal”  that  was  produced  at  the  end  of  the  conference  was  the  fruit  of  a 
negotiation  in  which the EU was not  invited.  Although  more  successful,  the  second 
summit  in  Cancun a year  later  once again saw the absence of  any  joint  EU-China 
activity on the conference floor. Thus, it is reasonable to deduct that this partnership has 
not proved fruitful in shaping the Chinese vision of climate change, nor in establishing 
the  EU  as  the  holder  of  the  “leadership  role  in  the  international  climate  change 
negotiations”. Rather it has given rise to a need for a further review of the EU climate  
change strategy and, more generally, of its external policies, in order to both be more 
assertive and also to be able to be perceived as a united actor. A comparison with the 
other  bilateral  partnerships  established  by  the EU in  this  field  may  prove  fruitful  to 
understand better the flaws of the EU approach. If other emerging countries share the 
same  perception  of  China  on  the  EU,  it  would  be  better  for  Brussels  to  draw  the 
necessary conclusion that today a climate change agreement can only be negotiated at 
a multilateral level. This effort would require treating these emerging countries as peers 
and  understanding  that  their  positions  may  significantly  differ  from  that  of  the  EU. 
Indeed, despite the EU’s pretension to be the leader in the climate change negotiations, 
it  seems  unable  to  influence  the  other  actors  through  its  leadership  by  example. 
Furthermore, it seems incapable of understanding their positions at the multilateral level 
through the tool of bilateral partnerships. This assessment should at least lead to new 
thinking on the capacities of the EU to dialogue with its partners and to seek ways to 
promote reciprocal understanding of concerns and strategies on climate change.
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